The operation, which prompted outcry from chiefs, targeted the Gelweng, a community militia that persistently resisted a government order to disarm.
The air raid, described by Warrap State Minister of Information Mamer Bath Marol as “wide ranging”, followed an order from the SSPDF urging the youth to voluntarily disarm in June 2025.
A subsequent order from the Chief of Defence Forces on October 12, 2025, gave the armed youth a 21-day ultimatum to surrender their firearms. This 21-day period expired around November 2, 2025.
As of early November 2025, Warrap State officials reported a low response to the voluntary surrender, with many youths reluctant to give up their weapons without security guarantees. The state government has officially launched the forceful disarmament operation.
Originally formed to protect cattle herds from raiders, the Gelweng have transformed into well-armed militias deeply entangled in inter-communal conflict and, at times, direct clashes with government security forces.
Recent fighting in Tonj East, Tonj North, and Tonj South counties has once again thrown the spotlight on the group’s growing influence — and the government’s struggle to contain them.
Despite repeated peace dialogues and disarmament campaigns, Warrap remains one of the most volatile states in South Sudan, where traditional defense systems have evolved into a persistent security challenge.
Understanding the Gelweng
The Gelweng, a Dinka term meaning “cattle guards,” were initially community defense groups tasked with protecting herds from neighboring raiders, particularly during and after the second Sudanese civil war.
In the 1980s and 1990s, when formal policing structures collapsed, communities armed their youth to defend livestock — the main source of wealth, dowry, and social status among pastoralists.
However, the line between protection and aggression soon blurred. As the decades passed, many Gelweng members gained access to military-grade weapons, often through alliances with local militias or leftover arms from the liberation struggle.
What began as a communal defense mechanism gradually evolved into localized warlordism, with competing youth groups launching deadly raids to restock stolen cattle, avenge attacks, or assert dominance over grazing land.
Major clashes and the cost of violence
Warrap State has experienced some of the deadliest inter-communal fighting in South Sudan’s post-independence history, often involving the Gelweng.
In August 2020, for instance, a disarmament campaign in Tonj East erupted into violence after armed youth resisted security forces, resulting in the deaths of over 80 soldiers and civilians. The confrontation underscored how deeply entrenched the Gelweng had become — both militarily and socially — within the local power dynamics.
Two months earlier, Mondiar Maker, the commander of Gelweng, was killed following a standoff with government troops after declaring that he was joining Kerbino Wol’s 7th October Movement, a newly formed rebel group at the time.
In March 2022, fresh clashes in Tonj North County left at least 28 people dead and dozens injured in what officials described as revenge attacks between rival communities. Similar patterns were reported in 2023 and 2024, where periodic fighting between Gelweng groups from Tonj East and Tonj North counties led to dozens of casualties, mass displacement, and cattle losses.
In October 2025, new fighting in Tonj East once again prompted the government to deploy additional security forces to restore calm. Local officials described the violence as a spillover from long-standing disputes between Gelweng youth and neighboring communities over grazing routes and stolen cattle.
How the Gelweng acquire arms
According to findings by Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility, the Gelweng’s access to arms dates back to the liberation struggle, when the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) armed local youth to defend their communities and cattle against external militias and northern-aligned raiders.
During the 1980s and 1990s, as formal security structures collapsed, SPLA commanders distributed rifles to Dinka cattle keepers in Warrap, Lakes, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal to create local defense units that could protect villages from cross-border attacks.
A report by Small Arms Survey indicates that many of these weapons were never reclaimed after the war ended, instead remaining in the hands of the same youth who later became known as the Gelweng.
Since then, the flow of arms has continued through various channels — battlefield captures, political patronage, black-market purchases, and illicit cross-border trade — sustaining the group’s firepower long after independence.
In some cases, local politicians and security elites have reportedly rearmed these youths for political or tribal leverage, further entrenching the Gelweng’s militarization and complicating government disarmament efforts.
Government response and challenges
Successive administrations in Juba have attempted to curb the Gelweng menace through disarmament drives, reconciliation conferences, and military deployments.
The 2020 Tonj disarmament campaign, launched under President Salva Kiir’s directive, was one of the largest such operations in the country’s history. Yet it ended in tragedy and deepened mistrust between communities and state security organs.
In recent years, the Warrap State government — under Governor Kuol Muor Muor and later Governor Manhiem Bol Malek — has prioritized peacebuilding through traditional dialogue and community policing. The Ministry of Interior and the SSPDF have repeatedly vowed to neutralize illegal armed groups, but the absence of consistent law enforcement, coupled with poverty and political patronage, continues to undermine these efforts.
Observers say the Gelweng problem is not merely a law-and-order issue but a symptom of weak governance and unresolved local grievances. As long as cattle remain central to livelihoods and young men see no alternative sources of income or status, the cycle of violence is likely to persist.
The Gelweng phenomenon reflects South Sudan’s broader struggle to transition from decades of war to sustainable peace. While community defense initiatives once filled a security vacuum, their unchecked militarization now threatens national stability.
Authorities had warned that armed youths who do not comply with the order will face “maximum penalties” and be considered hostile forces, facing the full force of the national army.
Like the White Army in the Upper Nile, and the Red Belt in Jonglei in recent months, the Gelweng, once armed by the SPLM/A in Warrap – the homestead of President Salva Kiir and other senior military officers – refuses to lay arms and remains a force the modern-day government has struggled to contain.
