JUBA – South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice President Riek Machar will meet next Wednesday to deliberate on the recommendations of a high-level committee that has proposed extending the transitional period to February 2027, a government official said.
The committee, tasked with assessing the progress of the revitalized peace agreement, has recommended a 24-month extension starting in February 2024 to allow for full implementation, according to committee members who spoke to Sudans Post in early July.
Speaking during a plenary meeting of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC) on Thursday, South Sudan’s Cabinet Minister Martin Elia Lomuro confirmed that the presidency meeting, originally scheduled for an earlier date, will now be held next week.
In addition to the transitional period extension, the meeting will also address the outcome of the recent Nairobi peace talks (also known as the “Tumaini Initiative”), a peace effort led by Kenya at the request of President Kiir.
“We are very keen to hear what is being done or planned as in the implementation of the road map of R-ARCISS and also on political direction as December 2024 closes in. I would like to begin by saying that the high-level standing committee completed its analysis of the implementation status and agreed on the way forward,” Lomuro told the R-JMEC meeting.
“The agreement on the way forward is that every party to the agreement would provide its own version of the way forward and indeed the ITGONU, the SPLM-IO, the OPP, the FDs and SSOA have provided their proposals as to how we should proceed from there,” he added.
Lomuro said the proposals will be discussed by the presidency in a meeting slated for next Wednesday. He described the upcoming meeting as a crucial moment in determining the country’s political future concerning the extension of the transitional period and the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement.
“The results of those discussions will provide a sense of political direction as to how the country should continue from there on,” he said, adding that the details of these discussions would remain confidential until the presidency meeting is concluded.
Commenting on the Kenya-led peace talks, Lomuro provided an extensive critique of the Tumaini Initiative, revealing concerns about the significant deviations from the R-ARCISS protocols, particularly regarding governance and security sector reforms.
His primary criticism centered on the proposed establishment of a National Leadership Council (NLC) by the Tumaini protocols. He argued that this new body, which would provide political leadership and have the final say on national matters, fundamentally breaches the powers of the presidency, the council of ministers, and the parliament as established by the revitalized deal.
“Deviation three on the establishment of something called the National Leadership Council under section 6.1.1 of the section 6 on the grantors with a chairperson and deputy provides political leadership [and] underlined the word ‘provide political leadership’ and its decision is final not subject to approval by the cabinet or parliament under section 6.1.7, a direct replacement to the presidency and the council of ministers and the parliament. This is contrary to the provisions of article 1.9.6 on decision making and consultation procedures and establishment of presidency in particular subsection 1.9.6.1 of the R-ARCISS,” he asserted.
He highlighted that the Tumaini Initiative’s introduction of the NLC effectively creates a parallel government structure that could destabilize the country’s governance system which he said is being planned for capture from outside.
Lomuro also raised concerns about the proposed security sector reform oversight commission, which would operate independently of the ministry of defense and the Joint Defense Board (JDB). This commission, as suggested by the Tumaini protocols, would be headed by a neutral South Sudanese military or security expert, a move that Lomuro said contradicts the provisions of Article 2.4 of the revitalized peace agreement.
“Deviation one is on the establishment of security sector reform oversight commission to be headed by a neutral South Sudanese military or security expert contrary to the provisions of article 2.4 and its sub-articles on mechanism for security arrangements under the R-ARCISS. Its members are to be vetted by something called the National Leadership Council (NLC). That is a direct contradiction and contravention of the R-ARCISS. The proposed South Sudan security sector reform oversight commission effectively sits between the Ministry of Defense and the JDB and it operates independent of the two,” he said.
Another significant concern raised by Lomuro is the proposal to establish a National Implementation and Oversight Committee (NIOC), which would be funded by the government, the Tumaini Initiative, and international donors. He criticized this proposal as an attempt to replace the National Transitional Committee (NTC) established under the R-ARCISS, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement.
“Deviation four on the establishment of a national implementation and oversight committee to be funded by the government into many initiatives and donors. The National Implementation Oversight Committee effectively replaces the NTC which is a continuation of NPTC under article 1.7 and is funded by the government and the Tumaini initiative. The Tumaini Initiative is supposed to be the mediators. We don’t understand how mediators can now become funders. The NIOC is comprised of members seconded as representative by the parties to the NLC and civil society-based groups other stakeholders, donors, the partners and you will have a head of the secretariat and deputy to be appointed by the NLC. The NLC is now the presidency effectively. It is a replacement of the high-level standing committee for the implementation of R-ARCISS and the National Technical Committee (NTC),” he said.
Lomuro argued that these proposed changes would shift the control of South Sudan’s peace process to external actors, undermining the autonomy of the government and the provisions of the R-ARCISS.
“Effectively that replaces RJMEC, IGAD participation in the implementation of R-ARICSS. And it is supposed to steward monitor and oversee implementation of consensus in liaison with the NLC not even the government. It is to review reports and brief and engage with the East African Community, the IGAD, the AU, the TROIKA, the EU, the UN, Group of Sant’Egidio, friends of South Sudan, the regional and international bodies and partners. You can see these grantors are effectively all the heads of state of East African Community and IGAD, replacing the grantors already known to be Uganda and Sudan and creating a massive institution that is to effectively run South Sudan from outside,” he said.
Lomuro concluded by reiterating the government’s position that while the Tumaini Initiative is welcome, it must align with the R-ARCISS and should not serve as a replacement or parallel agreement.
“Under article 8.4 of the R-ARCISS, no one is allowed to change or deviate from the R-ARCISS except the party signatories to the agreement. We are saying while the remaining consensus is welcome, it should align itself with the R-ARCISS, should be an attachment to the R-ARCISS and not a replacement or a parallel agreement to the R-ARCISS, because it endangers the established structures and systems which are in existence,” he said.
“I want to be clear on this because when we say these people say these are people who are against peace no, we want this peace to continue undisturbed because the responsibility of this government is only to take the country to elections and we’re almost there. Yes, delay but we agree but it’s better delayed than to be disturbed and revert the country to again violence and that’s the position the government takes,” he concluded.
