JUBA – South Sudan’s transitional government has said the Kenya-led Tumaini peace initiative, which led to the signing of eight protocols in July, is threatening the established structures and systems underpinning the 2018 revitalized peace agreement.
Since May, the transitional government and non-signatory opposition groups to the revitalized peace agreement have been holding talks in Kenya to address conflicts in the world’s youngest nation.
The parties signed an agreement comprising eight protocols on July 15, 2024. These protocols include the Security Supervision Mechanism, Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, National Transitional Committee, and Strategic Defense and Security Review Board, to be co-chaired by the parties to the 2018 agreement.
The SPLM-IO, a key signatory to the revitalized peace agreement and a participant in the Nairobi talks, subsequently withdrew from the Tumaini Initiative, arguing the process undermines the implementation of the 2018 peace deal. The government, until today, has been dismissing these claims as “baseless”.
Speaking during an RJMEC meeting in Juba on Thursday, South Sudan’s cabinet minister and government representative to the RJMEC, Martin Elia Lomuro, raised concerns about the initiative. He claimed that some of its protocols are designed to replace existing mechanisms.
“We did comparative analysis of these protocols against the R-ARCSS and the roadmap. And from our findings, the eight sections, there are deviations and contradictions from the revitalized agreement of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the roadmap, particularly on two sections. One on the protocol of permanent ceasefire, security arrangements and reforms, and on grantors,” Lomuro said.
The minister specifically criticized the initiative’s proposal to establish a security sector reform oversight commission, which he said contradicts the R-ARCSS.
He also objected to the creation of a Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) to replace the existing Joint Defense Board (JDB) and criticized the proposed National Implementation and Oversight Committee, arguing that it duplicates the role of the National Transitional Committee (NTC).
“Deviation four on the establishment of a national implementation and oversight committee to be funded by the government into many initiatives and donors. The National Implementation Oversight Committee effectively replaces the NTC which is a continuation of MPTC under Article 1.7. And it’s funded by the government and too many initiatives are supposed to be the mediators. We don’t understand how mediators can now become funders,” he said.
Lomuro strongly opposed the establishment of a National Leadership Council under the Tumaini initiative, describing it as a direct replacement for the presidency, council of ministers, and parliament.
“Deviation three on the establishment of something called the National Leadership Council under section 6.1.1 of the section six of the grantors with the chairperson and deputy provide political leadership underline the word provide political leadership. And its decision is final, not subject to approval by the cabinet or parliament under section 6.1.7,” he said.
“It’s a direct replacement to the presidency and the council of ministers and the parliament,” he warned, emphasizing that the initiative should align with the R-ARCSS rather than replacing it.