What is actually functioning as DPI in South Sudan

JUBA – South Sudan is accelerating its embrace of digital systems across public finance, border control, civil service management, and service delivery, despite lacking the foundational layers typically required for a coherent Digital Public Infrastructure. In the absence of a national digital identity, interoperable public registries, or comprehensive data protection laws, the country’s digital transition has evolved unevenly.

What exists today is not a unified DPI, but a collection of fragmented systems operating in parallel. These platforms increasingly shape governance, accountability, and access to services, even as their sustainability and public ownership remain uncertain.

Between October 2025 and January 2026, Sudans Post documented how digital platforms are reshaping state functions under conditions of political fragility, economic crisis, and institutional weakness. Government authorities rely heavily on digitisation to manage revenue, payrolls, borders, and payments, yet these systems are often introduced as isolated reforms rather than as interoperable public goods. As a result, digitalization has advanced faster than governance frameworks.

This imbalance has created a digital state that functions in practice, but not fully in principle.

Years of conflict, rural insecurity, and economic collapse have further distorted South Sudan’s digital landscape. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced into urban centres, particularly the capital Juba, creating a sharp urban bias in digital infrastructure.

Telecom networks, banking services, and e-government platforms remain concentrated in cities, while border regions and rural counties remain digitally excluded. In many areas, the absence of connectivity directly undermines security reporting, access to public services, and participation in state systems.

As a result, South Sudan’s most consequential digital systems are not the nationally envisioned platforms such as a unified digital ID, interoperable public registries, or fully integrated e-government services, but the fragmented systems already in use. These de facto platforms function as DPI in practice, even when they fall outside formal policy frameworks.

De facto DPI systems operating without a national framework

South Sudan’s financial sector offers one of the clearest examples of de facto DPI. The launch of the Inter-Bank Payment and Settlement System by the Bank of South Sudan in October marked the first interoperable digital backbone linking commercial banks through real-time settlement and automated clearing. The platform enables instant transfers, bulk payments such as salaries, and electronic government transactions.

In a cash-starved economy, it has emerged as a critical alternative to physical currency movement, reducing systemic risk and transaction delays. However, public confidence remains fragile. Many businesses do not consistently accept digital payments, citing liquidity constraints and the need to settle suppliers in cash, which in turn discourages retailers from using electronic transactions. This broken acceptance chain reinforces a preference for cash and contributes to widespread currency hoarding.

Mobile money platforms operated by telecom companies have further expanded digital payments beyond the banking sector. With more than a million active users, these platforms facilitate daily transactions worth billions of South Sudanese pounds, supporting remittances, bill payments, and humanitarian cash transfers.

Yet usage remains cautious and often transactional rather than habitual. Businesses frequently demand cash because wholesalers and service providers themselves refuse digital payments, pushing retailers and consumers back into cash-based exchanges. This circular dependency undermines trust in digital money and limits mobile platforms’ ability to function as a fully reliable national payments layer, despite their growing reach and practical importance.

These digital platforms remain precarious, as their functionality is tethered to a fragile and uneven network infrastructure. Outside of Juba, where mobile coverage is intermittent, these systems degrade sharply during network outages, localized insecurity, or fuel shortages. This lack of reliability often forces a “connectivity retreat,” where essential services—from digital payments to social registries—revert to manual, cash-based processes, effectively stalling the nation’s digital momentum in rural regions.

Border management is another area where digital systems are emerging as functional DPI. The government’s push for a one-stop border post at Nimule reflects an effort to combine physical infrastructure with customs automation, electronic clearance, and digital cargo tracking. While the project is still under development, officials increasingly rely on digital systems to monitor imports, coordinate inspections, and reduce revenue leakages. These tools now shape daily border operations, despite lacking a fully integrated national trade data framework.

Digital revenue collection systems have also become central to state operations, particularly in customs and taxation. According to government and industry sources, the primary digital platform used for tax and revenue collection is not owned by the state but by Adut Salva Kiir Mayardit, the daughter of President Salva Kiir who is also the South Sudanese head of state’s presidential envoy. Despite its private ownership, the platform is embedded in routine revenue collection and functions as a core component of the country’s digital fiscal infrastructure.

Civil service management has also moved toward digitisation through biometric registration exercises aimed at eliminating ghost workers. Supported by the World Bank, the system assigns unique biometric identifiers to public servants to clean payrolls and improve fiscal oversight. Yet in the absence of a national digital ID, the database remains siloed. It functions as a payroll control mechanism rather than a scalable identity layer that could link taxation, banking, or social services.

Humanitarian and health-sector systems form another critical layer of South Sudan’s de facto DPI. The Ministry of Health, with support from WHO, UNICEF, and other partners, relies on digital health information systems to track disease outbreaks, service delivery, and medical supply chains nationwide. These platforms operate continuously even during periods of state dysfunction. In practice, they constitute some of the country’s most stable and widely used digital infrastructures.

International aid organisations also run large-scale digital registration and payment systems covering millions of displaced people. These include biometric beneficiary databases and mobile cash transfer platforms used for food assistance, health support, and emergency relief. In many regions, these systems are more reliable than government services. They effectively substitute for absent state infrastructure, shaping how people access resources and recognition.

Why South Sudan’s digital systems fall short of DPG principles

Despite their functionality, South Sudan’s de facto digital systems fall short of Digital Public Goods principles. Most platforms are proprietary, donor-driven, or controlled by private entities, limiting transparency and public ownership. Source code is rarely open, standards are inconsistently applied, and interoperability remains weak. As a result, systems that function nationally do not integrate into a shared digital ecosystem.

Humanitarian and health systems illustrate this tension clearly. While they provide nationwide coverage and continuity, governance remains external. Data ownership, system upgrades, and long-term sustainability depend on donor priorities rather than national policy. These platforms function as parallel infrastructures rather than integrated public assets, limiting their ability to support broader state-building objectives.

Affordability and access further constrain the public value of digital systems. High data costs, weak rural connectivity, and network instability exclude large segments of the population. Telecom-driven platforms expand reach, but their pricing structures undermine inclusivity. Without affordable internet and open standards, digital services risk reinforcing inequality rather than reducing it.

Political and security dynamics also shape the digital environment. An investigation published by Sudans Post in December found that digital tools—including mobile networks—are used by authorities for monitoring activists and restricting movement. In the absence of data protection laws and independent oversight, digitalization carries surveillance risks. This undermines trust and discourages civic engagement with digital systems.

South Sudan’s digital trajectory in regional perspective

The African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy (2020–2030) outlines a continent-wide vision built around foundational Digital Public Infrastructure, including digital identity, interoperable public platforms, data governance, and affordable connectivity. The strategy positions these layers as prerequisites for inclusive growth, state capacity, and regional integration, particularly in fragile and post-conflict contexts.

It emphasizes public ownership, open standards, and interoperability as safeguards against fragmentation and exclusion. In theory, the AU framework offers a roadmap for countries like South Sudan to build coherent digital systems that serve both governance and public interest.

South Sudan’s current digital trajectory diverges sharply from this vision. Rather than building foundational DPI layers first, the country has adopted a patchwork of project-based systems driven by immediate operational needs in revenue collection, payments, health, and humanitarian response.

These systems function in practice but lack the interoperability, legal grounding, and public ownership envisioned by the AU strategy. As a result, digitalization has advanced unevenly, reinforcing silos between ministries, aid platforms, and private operators instead of creating shared national infrastructure.

The contrast highlights a central risk identified by the AU strategy itself, which is the fact that digitisation without foundational DPI can deepen inequality, weaken accountability, and entrench proprietary control over essential public functions. In South Sudan, limited connectivity, high data costs, and the absence of a national digital identity further undermine the strategy’s core principles of inclusion and access.

While the AU framework remains aspirational in this context, it provides a benchmark against which South Sudan’s de facto digital systems can be assessed—revealing both the scale of progress made and the structural gaps that continue to limit long-term sustainability and public trust.

South Sudan’s digital state is therefore functional but fragile. What exists today is a patchwork of systems performing essential roles without the legal, technical, and institutional foundations of a coherent Digital Public Infrastructure. In the absence of a national digital identity, interoperable public registries, open standards, and enforceable data protection frameworks, digitisation has advanced unevenly and often reactively.

The central challenge is no longer whether digital systems exist, but whether they can be consolidated into inclusive, accountable Digital Public Goods that serve the public interest rather than narrow institutional or proprietary needs.

A unified DPI framework for South Sudan would require a publicly owned national digital identity system, interoperable registries linking health, payments, civil service, and taxation, and the adoption of open technical standards governed by law.

Equally critical would be clear legal protections for data privacy, transparency, and oversight, particularly in a context where digital platforms are increasingly embedded in revenue collection, service delivery, and security operations. Without these foundations, digital systems will continue to function in isolation, limiting scalability, trust, and long-term sustainability.

Other African states emerging from conflict and institutional collapse, including Somalia and Sierra Leone, have prioritized nationally owned digital identity systems and interoperable payment rails as the backbone of their DPI strategies, even under conditions of weak connectivity and insecurity.

These approaches emphasize public ownership, gradual integration, and legal governance over rapid platform expansion. While contexts differ, such models highlight pathways through which fragile states can move from fragmented digital adoption toward resilient, publicly accountable digital infrastructure.