South Sudan’s dual role in Sudan’s conflict

JUBA – Since the onset of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), South Sudan has appeared officially neutral, refraining from overtly supporting either faction. This neutral stance is essential only to steps in ending the Sudanese conflict, but also due to South Sudan’s reliance on oil exports routed through Sudan. Both the SAF and RSF control various territories along these vital routes to Port Sudan, from where South Sudanese oil is exported to the international market.

In late October, a high-level South Sudanese delegation visited Port Sudan, the temporary Sudanese capital, to discuss oil transportation. Oil flow from South Sudan halted earlier this year following a pipeline rupture, exacerbating economic pressures on the young nation, which already struggles to pay its civil servants. Much of South Sudan’s revenue from non-oil sources is diverted by corruption, leaving little for state expenditure.

On November 1, 2024, Radio Tamazuj reported an agreement between South Sudan’s government and the RSF for safeguarding oil pipelines in RSF-controlled areas. Although undated, this agreement likely preceded the delegation’s visit to finalize arrangements with authorities in Port Sudan.

South Sudan’s reliance on agreements with both the SAF and RSF for oil transit has obligated it to comply with conditions set by both factions. These likely include unrestricted transportation of oil to RSF-controlled areas in West Kordofan and South Darfur, as well as facilitating SAF troop redeployments through South Sudanese territory.

On November 21, a Sudanese trader in Wanjok, Aweil East County, disclosed to Sudans Post that he and other traders as well as South Sudan army commander Maj. Gen. Akuei Ajou – known locally as “Akuei Abusala” – are actively involved in transporting oil to Sudan. He said that Akuei, who served as the commander of the SSPDF’s 3^rd Infantry Division until January 2024, holds a significant stake in the fuel trade.

The trader, who identified himself as Ahmed, stated that the fuel trade between South Sudan’s Aweil East County and Sudan’s South Darfur and East Darfur states has flourished since the Sudan conflict began, benefiting from the disruption of fuel imports from Chad caused by the Joint Forces of Armed Struggle Movements (JSAMF).

Ahmed added that South Sudanese authorities do not effectively impose restrictions on trade with RSF-controlled areas in Darfur, as importing goods from those regions is easier than sourcing them from Juba.

“It is by no means something that can be blatantly denied. Even consumer goods are transported to Sudan through Majok-Yithiou and on to Meiram. It is a barter trade where people from South Sudan take fuel from here (Aweil) to Sudan and receive goods that are far more expensive than the fuel they provide. This is one of the reasons why individuals like General Akuei, along with many other generals, are involved,” he said.

A Sudans Post reporter observed a fuel tanker near the Wanjok roundabout (exactly here: 9° 1’28.14″N 27°33’39.11″E) on November 20, which locals have reported to have been travelling to Al Meiram, 125 kilometers to the north of the town, at least three times a week. Al Meiram, previously hosting the 92^nd Infantry Brigade of the SAF’s 22^nd Infantry Division, has been under RSF control since late and early July.

Separately, a South Sudanese trader in Majok Yithiou, also in Aweil East County, confirmed the movement of fuel from South Sudan to Sudan, often through barter trade. He noted that goods received from Sudanese traders and RSF collaborators are disproportionately expensive compared to the fuel provided.

“It is by no means something one can blatantly deny. Even consumer goods go to Sudan through Majok-Yithiou up to Meiram, and it is a barter trade in which people from South Sudan take fuel from here (Majok) to Sudan and receive goods that are very expensive, even more so than the fuel they provide. This is one of the reasons why even people like General Akuei are involved, along with many other generals,” he said.

Sudanese traders have also been using the Amiet Market, also known as Al Naam Market by Arab nomads, as a key fuel trading hub between Sudan and South Sudan. The market is situated within South Sudan’s Abyei Administrative Area, approximately 13.5 kilometers from Abyei town, the disputed territory’s capital.

Sudans Post reviewed a video (above), shared on social media in mid-November, showing fuel vendors at the market. The video was geolocated to a point north of Abyei town at coordinates 9°51’5.92″N, 28°28’46.21″E. Sources indicate that fuel vendors travel south to Amiet Market to purchase fuel originating from South Sudan, which is then sold at vendor points frequented by elements of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Between September and October, the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) used Ural trucks to transport SAF troops from Northern Bahr el Ghazal to Juba. From there, they were taken to Bentiu and later to Heglig in West Kordofan. The redeployed troops, part of SAF’s 92^nd Brigade, had been stationed in Meiram before the RSF took control. Following the RSF takeover, they retreated to Aweil East County, remaining there until their transport to Juba in September.

Typically, when soldiers or rebel fighters from one country are forced to cross into another after being dislodged from their bases, they are often interned under international humanitarian law. This status restricts them from resuming hostilities and provides them with protection.

Repatriation of such forces is typically overseen by international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to ensure compliance with international norms and standards, including the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of individuals to a place where they may face persecution or danger.

Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Bol, the head of Moral Orientation for SSPDF’s 3^rd Infantry Division, confirmed to Sudans Post that more than 300 SAF troops were transported to Juba by both land and air before being handed over to the Sudanese embassy. “We received our neighbors’ army, the SAF,” Lt. Col. Alberto said. “They weren’t transported back by road to Meiram. We just received them [here in Northern Bahr el Ghazal], took them to Juba, and Juba facilitated their return back to their country.”

It remains unclear whether this arrangement was overseen by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At the time of writing, the ICRC had not responded to an inquiry from Sudans Post regarding this matter.

When approached for comment, SSPDF spokesman Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang declined to respond and instead directed inquiries to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, as he had previously done when SAF troops began arriving in South Sudan in July.

A reliable security source informed Sudans Post on October 25, 2024, that SSPDF helicopters were deployed a few days earlier to airlift SAF soldiers from Juba to Unity and Upper Nile States, from where they continued overland to Heglig and Jabelen. Sudans Post was initially unable to independently verify this claim, though evidence of SSPDF involvement with SAF was increasingly available.

A resident of Kaikang, a small military area north of Mayom County headquarters in Unity State, recounted seeing a helicopter landing several times a week from early October. On example was the last landing in the area on October 19 at approximately 6:00 PM. The helicopter, with five crew members—two foreigners and three South Sudanese—disembarked several soldiers described as “Arab,” a term locally used for Sudanese.

Descriptions of the helicopter provided by the local resident and a charcoal trader aligned with characteristics of an SSPDF helicopter that subsequently landed in Bor, Jonglei State, on October 20. Onboard were two Ukrainian engineers and three South Sudanese pilots. One of the South Sudanese pilots mentioned they had come from Upper Nile State’s Renk County and landed in Bor due to inclement weather. Another crew member, a South Sudanese, claimed they were transporting injured soldiers following clashes with local civilians in Nasir County.

However, the reporter observed several families, including children and women, onboard the helicopter. No evidence supported the claim of transporting wounded soldiers, and the timing raised questions. Fighting between locals and SSPDF soldiers in Nasir took place on October 16, which would make a five-day delay in evacuating injured soldiers unlikely.

In Geiger, east of Joda South near the Sudan-South Sudan border in northern Renk County, civilians reported observing a helicopter coming from the direction of Renk town before landing on the morning of October 20. This suggests that the helicopter that landed in Bor first flew from Juba to Kaikang in Unity State, then to Renk County, before heading back to Juba, where it made an emergency landing in Bor.

The possibility arises that the helicopter was transporting unarmed SAF soldiers to West Kordofan for redeployment, and the wounded ones to Sudan border for transfer to White Nile State’s capital, Rabak where they would receive medical attentions.

This movement contravenes UN recommendations, as it risks exacerbating the Sudanese conflict. Despite international calls for countries to cease support for Sudan’s warring factions, a security source indicated that an arrangement exists between Juba and Port Sudan to use South Sudan as a base for reinforcing besieged SAF troops in Heglig.

This agreement complements an existing pact under which the Sudan Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) manages South Sudan’s airspace, potentially providing SAF with strategic leverage over the RSF. South Sudan has been reliant on Sudan for air traffic control since independence, lacking its own infrastructure for this purpose.

In December last year, Sudan dispatched six experienced air traffic controllers to oversee South Sudan’s airspace, potentially enabling SAF to monitor RSF movements, gather intelligence, and even launch airstrikes on RSF supply lines based on information gathered in what is South Sudan’s only international airport.

On November 22, a Sudanese trader in Aweil told Sudans Post that his brother was among the forces who had retreated to Northern Bahr el Ghazal in July. According to him, approximately 470 SAF troops have since been taken to Heglig, one of three SAF strongholds in West Kordofan. The SAF maintains control of the 22^nd Infantry Division headquarters in Babanusa, the 90^th Brigade in Heglig, and the 81^st Brigade in Al-Nahud. The latter brigade is part of the 5^th Infantry Division (Hajana) headquartered in North Kordofan state’s capital, El Obeid.

In total, West Kordofan hosts four SAF brigades under the 22^nd Infantry Division: the 89^th Brigade in Muglad, the 90^th Brigade in Heglig (and Belila), the 91^st Brigade in El Fula, and the 92^nd Brigade in Al-Meiram. The RSF now controls nearly all of West Kordofan, except for the SAF’s 22^nd Infantry Division headquarters in Babanusa, its 90^th Brigade in Heglig and the 81^st Brigade of Hajana in Al-Nahud.

UN experts reported last year that South Sudan’s borders have been used to transport fuel to RSF-controlled areas in South Darfur through Western Bahr el Ghazal State. This practice, potentially perpetuated by individuals within the South Sudanese government, may still be ongoing.